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Dive deep into the fascinating world of Comprehension with our comprehensive set of Multiple-Choice Questions (MCQs). This page is dedicated to exploring the fundamental concepts and intricacies of Comprehension, a crucial aspect of UGC CBSE NET General Paper. In this section, you will encounter a diverse range of MCQs that cover various aspects of Comprehension, from the basic principles to advanced topics. Each question is thoughtfully crafted to challenge your knowledge and deepen your understanding of this critical subcategory within UGC CBSE NET General Paper.
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Q81.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. The ‘de facto’ values in the passage means
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. The ‘de facto’ values in the passage means
Answer: (a).What is
Q82.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. According to the passage, the ‘first reality’ constitutes
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. According to the passage, the ‘first reality’ constitutes
Answer: (d).Enlightened rationalism
Q83.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. Encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the human implies
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. Encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the human implies
Answer: (a).Restoration of normal vision
Q84.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. The contents of the passage are
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. The contents of the passage are
Answer: (d).Optional
Q85.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. The passage indicates that science has proved that
The catalytic fact of the twentieth century is uncontrollable development, consumerist society, political materialism, and spiritual devaluation. This inordinate development has led to the transcendental ‘second reality’ of sacred perception that biologically transcendence is a part of human life. As the century closes, it dawns with imperative vigour that the ‘first reality’ of enlightened rationalism and the ‘second reality’ of the Beyond have to be harmonised in a worthy state of man. The de facto values describe what we are, they portray the ‘is’ of our ethic, they are est values (Latin est means is). The ideal values tell us what we ought to be, they are esto values (Latin esto ‘ought to be’). Both have to be in the ebb and flow of consciousness. The ever new science and technology and the ever-perennial faith are two modes of one certainty, that is the wholeness of man, his courage to be, his share in Being.
The materialistic foundations of science have crumbled down. Science itself has proved that matter is energy, processes are as valid as facts, and affirmed the non - materiality of the universe. The encounter of the ‘two cultures’, the scientific and the humane, will restore the normal vision, and will be the bedrock of a ‘science of understanding’ in the new century. It will give new meaning to the ancient perception that quantity (measure) and quality (value) coexist at the root of nature. Human endeavours cannot afford to be humanistically irresponsible.
Que. The passage indicates that science has proved that
Answer: (b).matter is energy
Q86.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. An intellectual historian aims to fully understand
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. An intellectual historian aims to fully understand
Answer: (a).the chosen texts of his own
Q87.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. Intellectual historians do not claim exclusive possession of
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. Intellectual historians do not claim exclusive possession of
Answer: (b).any corpus of evidence
Q88.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. The misconceptions about intellectual history stem from
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. The misconceptions about intellectual history stem from
Answer: (a).a body of techniques
Q89.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. What is philistinism?
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. What is philistinism?
Answer: (d).Belief that power and its exercise matter
Q90.
Read the following passage carefully and answer the question that follow:
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. Knowledge of cosmological beliefs or moral ideas of a period can be drawn as part of
All historians are interpreters of text if they be private letters, Government records or parish birthlists or whatever. For most kinds of historians, these are only the necessary means to understanding something other than the texts themselves, such as a political action or a historical trend, whereas for the intellectual historian, a full understanding of his chosen texts is itself the aim of his enquiries. Of course, the intellectual history is particularly prone to draw on the focus of other disciplines that are habitually interpreting texts for purposes of their own, probing the reasoning that ostensibly connects premises and conclusions. Furthermore, the boundaries with adjacent subdisciplines are shifting and indistinct : the history of art and the history of science both claim a certain autonomy, partly just because they require specialised technical skills, but both can also be seen as part of a wider intellectual history, as is evident when one considers, for example, the common stock of knowledge about cosmological beliefs or moral ideals of a period.
Like all historians, the intellectual historian is a consumer rather than a producer of ‘methods’. His distinctiveness lies in which aspect of the past he is trying to illuminate, not in having exclusive possession of either a corpus of evidence or a body of techniques. That being said, it does seem that the label ‘intellectual history’ attracts a disproportionate share of misunderstanding.
It is alleged that intellectual history is the history of something that never really mattered. The long dominance of the historical profession by political historians bred a kind of philistinism, an unspoken belief that power and its exercise was ‘what mattered’. The prejudice was reinforced by the assertion that political action was never really the outcome of principles or ideas that were ‘more flapdoodle’. The legacy of this precept is still discernible in the tendency to require ideas to have ‘licensed’ the political class before they can be deemed worthy of intellectual attention, as if there were some reasons why the history of art or science, of philosophy or literature, were somehow of interest and significance than the history of Parties or Parliaments. Perhaps in recent years the mirror-image of this philistinism has been more common in the claim that ideas of any one is of systematic expression or sophistication do not matter, as if they were only held by a minority.
Que. Knowledge of cosmological beliefs or moral ideas of a period can be drawn as part of
Answer: (d).intellectual history
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